Nuclear weapons and arms control in Europe

Nuclear weapons in Europe

This chapter will now present the nuclear dimension of European arms control. It examines the status of nuclear arsenals globally and the difference between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. It also discusses the prospects and challenges connected with including Russian and US non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe in potential arms control negotiations and agreements.

Background information and definitions

US non-strategic nuclear weapons

The United States currently possesses only one type of NSWS: the B-61 gravity bomb. Experts estimate that the United States maintains approximately 200 such bombs in its stockpile, with roughly half of them deployed across six bases located in five European countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.⁴

US Nuclear weapons in Europe

US Nuclear weapons in Europe

Hosts of US nuclear weapons

The exact locations and quantities of the current deployments have not been publicly disclosed, however, and remain subject to expert estimates. They represent a significant reduction compared to the Cold War era when the US maintained over 7,000 forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe.

(Figure based on estimates from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, May 2022. Source: https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/op55-everything-counts.pdf (p. vi). )

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NATO nuclear sharing

The permanent deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe is often referred to as NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements (see also LU05). Nuclear sharing does not mean that one country simply hands control over its weapons or launch authority to another country. The weapons stationed by the United States on the territories of its allies remain firmly under US custody and control.

During periods of conflict, the US forward-deployed weapons may be made available to allies. Should the situation arise, the B-61 would be delivered by dual-capable aircraft (DCA), which are specifically modified to carry both nuclear and conventional weapons. Both the United States and (several of) its European allies have DCA.

According to NATO’s own communications

‘a nuclear mission can only be undertaken after explicit political approval is given by NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and authorization is received from the US President and UK Prime Minister’.

NATO Headquarter

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This approval process highlights the complex political considerations that NATO’s nuclear strategy involves.

Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons

As shown above, Russia is believed to currently possess between around 1,000 and 2,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads including warheads for short-range ballistic missiles, air- and sea-launched missiles, and missile defence forces.

It is important to note, however, that there are major uncertainties surrounding the precise count. Most of Russia’s non-strategic weapons systems are dual-capable, which means that some of them may be designed for conventional rather than nuclear missions. In addition, increases in the number of dual-capable launchers do not necessarily imply a corresponding increase in the number of nuclear warheads assigned to them. Many of the delivery platforms are also being overhauled and not all are deemed capable of launching nuclear weapons at this time.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union deployed nuclear weapons in several of its republics and satellites. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these weapons were repatriated to Russia.

Graph based on estimates from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, May 2022 Source: https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/op55-everything-counts.pdf (p. vi)

Russia recently announced that it planned to resume the practice of deploying nuclear weapons abroad. In a formal announcement on 25 March 2023, the Kremlin declared its intention to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus. Experts remain uncertain about whether the weapons have since been transferred to Belarusor where they might be stored.

While the current stockpile of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons represents an important reduction compared to the Cold War, the Kremlin still attributes significant importance to them. The Russian non-strategic arsenal is seen by Moscow as offsetting the superior conventional forces of NATO, especially of the United States. In addition to addressing NATO’s conventional capabilities, experts have argued that Russia also considers its non-strategic nuclear weapons as a means to counterbalance China’s large and increasingly capable conventional military forces and to maintain nuclear parity with the combined forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

Nuclear arms control in Europe

States pursue arms control to mitigate the likelihood of war. European arms control measures can be categorised along the following three dimensions.

European nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ)

There have been multiple attempts at establishing a NWFZ in Europe but so far to no avail (see also LU06).

The Soviet Union first initiated discussions on a NWFZ in Europe in 1956 within the United Nations, but these discussions did not progress beyond the committee level. In 1958, the Polish government presented the Rapacki Plan, named after the Polish foreign minister, as a tangible proposal for a NWFZ in Central Europe. The proposed NWFZ would include the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia, with other European countries having the option to join. Ultimately, however, the Rapacki Plan was rejected by NATO.

Proposals for a Nordic NWFZ or a NWFZ in the Balkans were discussed during the Cold War but never advanced to formal negotiations. Belarus proposed a NWFZ for Central and Eastern Europe in 1991, which did not materialise either.

Article VII of the nuclear 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) affirms the right to establish NWFZ.

Limits and reductions in nuclear arsenals

The strategic level

Over the past five decades, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have concluded a number of agreements that limited and reduced their nuclear arsenals. The table below includes an overview of the key agreements pertaining to their strategic arsenals, the limitations they impose and the time period covered.

	SALT I	SALT II	START I	START II	START III	SORT	New START
Status	Expired	Never entered into force	Expired	Never entered into force	Never negotiated	Replaced by New START	In force
Deployed warhead limit	N/A	N/A	6,000	3,000–3,500	2,000–2,500	1,700–2,200	1,550
Deployed delivery vehicle limit	US: 1,764 ICBMs and SLBMs; USSR: 2,568	2,250	1,600	N/A	N/A	N/A	700
Date signed	26 May 1972	18 June 1979	31 July 1991	3 January 1993	N/A	24 May 2002	8 April 2010
Date entered into force	3 October 1972	N/A	5 December 1994	N/A	N/A	1 June 2003	5 February 2011
Expiration date	3 October 1977	N/A	5 December 2009	N/A	N/A	5 February 2011	5 February 2026

(Table based on the overview provided by the Arms Control Association. For more information on the bilateral treaties between the US and the Soviet Union/Russia see learning unit 20. Source: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements)

In February 2023, the Kremlin announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in New START.

The non-strategic level

While the vast majority of efforts in this regard have focused on strategic arsenals, two major sets of initiatives⁵ focused on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

In 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which aimed to eliminate ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles (and related launchers) with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 km. Over time, both sides raised concerns about compliance. The United States accused Russia of testing and developing prohibited missiles (the Novator 9M729 missile, also known as RS-SSC-8 Screwdriver). Specifically, the 9M729 is a ground-launched cruise missile with an estimated range of 2,500 km, thus exceeding the intermediate-range cutoff enshrined in the INF. Meanwhile, Russia denied that it had breached the INF and countered the accusation with allegations of US violations linked to missile defence systems. While the Aegis Ashore system is intended to intercept incoming ballistic missiles, Russia argued that it could easily be modified to launch INF-prohibited cruise missiles. Russia also expressed concerns that the United States is testing missile defence systems using target missiles that are similar to intermediate-range missiles. Lastly, Moscow has accused the United States of making armed drones that are functionally equivalent to ground-launched cruise missiles, which the INF also prohibits. The US government has consistently maintained that US actions in all three areas were either not prohibited by or not subject to the INF Treaty. In 2019, the United States formally withdrew from the INF Treaty because of concerns about both Russian non-compliance and China’s growing missile arsenal.

In 1991, the US announced that it would unilaterally eliminate a number of non-strategic nuclear weapons and withdraw nearly all of them from deployment. In response, the Soviet Union committed to eliminate a large number of its own non-strategic nuclear weapons and pledged to withdraw non-strategic naval nuclear weapons from deployment. Experts estimate that these Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PSI) led to a reduction of 5,000 non-strategic nuclear warhead deployments for the United States and 13,000 for the Soviet Union/Russia.

Challenges for nuclear arms control in Europe

Footnotes

1. The FAS designates non-deployed weapons as those that are not currently deployed using launchers but in storage. ↩

2. The FAS defines weapons in the military stockpile as those active and inactive warheads that are in the custody of the military and earmarked for delivery by commissioned delivery vehicles. ↩

3. The Federation of American Scientists includes in its total inventory warheads in the stockpile as well as retired weapons that are waiting to be dismantled. ↩

4. There is currently uncertainty regarding a potential redeployment of US nuclear weapons at the Royal Air Force airbase at Lakenheath in the United Kingdom. See below. ↩

5. This discussion is based on the factsheet provided by the Arms Control Association, see https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreements. ↩