The future of European arms control

With the existing European arms control system in disarray and Russian aggression against Ukraine continuing, the feasibility of returning to measures involving numerical reductions of weapons or personnel, restraint in military activities and other cooperative arms control measures is questionable. Given the illegality and brutality of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, premature arms control outreach might be seen as indirectly normalising or legitimising Russian behaviour. Recent experiences with the INF, Open Skies and CFE Treaties may raise doubts as to whether the necessary level of confidence regarding the implementation of any future arms control commitments by a potential adversary could be achieved.

Ideas such as a moratorium on intermediate-range missile deployments in Europe are still being discussed. However, as long as Russia’s war on Ukraine continues, the conditions for reaching durable arms control agreements in Europe, which includes the existence of mutual interest in maintaining strategic stability, are not met. This does not preclude implementing basic risk reduction measures, such as maintaining military channels for emergency communication and incident prevention, however.

Arms control measures could potentially play an important role in the aftermath of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Even if the cornerstone of the security system in Europe is likely to be a mix of conventional and nuclear deterrence, arms control instruments may be useful in managing the confrontation and reducing the risk of a direct conflict between NATO and Ukraine, on the one side, and Russian forces, on the other. The precondition for restoring European arms control would be renewed interest from all sides in establishing the rules of the game and introducing basic transparency and predictability regarding deployment and activities of military forces as well as in maintaining effective communication channels for crisis management and de-escalation. In the short term, reductions of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe through arms control would probably be more difficult to achieve, given the emphasis on strengthening military capabilities that dominates in most European states.

Even in more favourable strategic conditions, several factors would shape the development of a future arms control system in Europe.

Strategic and political landscape in Europe: Feasibility of arms control measures will depend on the dynamics of European security. The outcome of Russia’s war on Ukraine will play a key role in establishing the framework for any potential arms control agreements. Ukraine’s progress towards NATO membership and the future role of the US in European security would also influence the prospects of European arms control.

Military balance: The post-war balance of military power between Russia, NATO and Ukraine may make it challenging to agree arms control measures based on equal ceilings and proportional reductions, especially as all sides will most likely continue introducing new weapons systems for use by their armed forces. Western countries would have overall numerical and qualitative advantage over Russia in most areas (with the exception of non-strategic nuclear weapons). This would make it difficult to establish a balance between adversaries through equal arms control limitations. New asymmetric or package approaches to arms control could be developed, including for example unequal ceilings or a broader range of systems and capabilities.

The scope of European arms control: The technological progress and lessons from Russia’s war on Ukraine will need to be factored in when designing new arms control and transparency measures to prevent the outbreak of war. The importance of including CFE’s five categories of Treaty-Limited Equipment – tanks, armoured combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters – in CAC agreements has been confirmed by the latest conflicts. Future confidence-building or arms control arrangements would need to address long-range ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles, certain categories of unmanned systems, missile defence systems, potentially also major naval forces and non-strategic nuclear weapons. The European arms control agenda would also need to be linked with global discussions on the control of lethal autonomous weapons, arms control in space and responsible use of AI.

Verification: The new generation of European arms control agreements would probably use the verification approaches of previous treaties, including information exchange and on-site inspection protocols. These would need to be augmented by adding verification technologies using new monitoring, gathering and data analysis tools. Open source analysis and societal verification may play an increasingly important role in supporting formal methods of arms control verification.

FURTHER READING

Conventional arms control

Nuclear weapons

The EU and arms control

Texts of relevant agreements:

General information: