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Unit 11Arms Control in EuropeChapter 5: The role of the European Union
Chapter 5

The role of the European Union

The EU’s toolkit for arms control

The European Union (EU) has not been a party to the most prominent conventional and nuclear arms control agreements, which primarily resulted from the fact that negotiations were between Russia (and previously the Soviet Union), the United States and European states acting in their national capacity.

A major forum for conventional arms control and confidence-building measures in Europe is provided by the OSCE, where the EU has a presence but does not substitute EU members who are OSCE participating states.

Flags of the OSCE participating states at the 12th OSCE Economic Forum in Prague, 31 May 2004

Source: OSCE/Mikhail Evstafiev (CC)

The EU has consistently stressed the importance of full compliance with and strict implementation, both in letter and spirit, of existing arms control and CSBM mechanisms and the need to update and adapt them to the evolving military and security environment.1 However, the erosion of this arms control framework has significant implications for Europe, as these agreements are mainly focused on the European region. Despite not having played a major role in establishing the current arms control framework, the EU possesses several tools that it can use to leverage its economic, political and diplomatic influence in order to safeguard its interests in this realm.

Since adopting its 2003 Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (see also LU14), the EU has gradually established a role for itself in the field of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. The 2016 Global Strategy, for example, stresses that

the EU will strongly support the expanding membership, universalization, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes […] The EU will actively participate in export control regimes, strengthen common rules governing member states’ export policies of military – including dual use – equipment and technologies, and support export control authorities in third countries and technical bodies that sustain arms control regimes.

European Union 2016

Another relevant document, the 2022 Strategic Compass states that the EU

will uphold, support and further advance the disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control framework. We will continue to support the centrality on the NPT and stress the need to implement all obligations under it, and commitments during previous review conferences, including the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of article VI, with the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. We need to increase our capacities to control intangible transfers, including scientific knowledge where necessary. This entails protecting and reinforcing existing export control regimes. Confronted with new challenges emerging from new technologies, the EU remains committed to preserve the disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control architecture. A coordinated approach with partners is also essential in this regard.

European Union 2016

Both the 2016 Global Strategy and the 2022 Strategic Compass confirm the continuity of the EU’s efforts over time, particularly its support for existing multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control treaties and regimes. Among others, the EU actively participates in export control regimes (see LU12), supports the centrality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and emphasises the need to fulfil all obligations and commitments from previous review conferences. This includes making tangible progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, with the ultimate goal of total nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the EU collaborates with international organisations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen global arms control regimes.

The EU has a diverse array of tools it can draw on in the realm of arms control

Financial and technical assistance

The EU offers substantial financial and technical aid to support arms control efforts. This includes capacity building in third countries to regulate arms transfers, prevent illicit trafficking, and implement international arms control agreements.

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Under Article 37 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the EU can become a party to international agreements in the security domain.

Military and civilian missions

The EU can establish military and civilian missions for various purposes, including ‘joint disarmament operations’.

Arms export control system

The EU maintains a comprehensive system for controlling arms exports.

Sanctions and arms embargoes

The EU has the competence to impose sanctions, including arms embargoes, against third states.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) clause

The EU incorporates a WMD clause alongside other conditionality clauses in political cooperation agreements with third parties. The WMD clause requires partner countries to comply with their non-proliferation obligations and encourages them to join relevant treaties they have not yet acceded to. The clause also enables the EU to terminate an agreement if a partner country breaches its commitments in this regard.

EU efforts and the way forward

For several decades, the European Union has been a very active player in arms control in Europe and beyond.2 The EU’s efforts have focused on various fields:

Conventional arms control and risk reduction

In the past, the EU underlined the need to overcome the stalemate on the CFE Treaty and its support for discussions leading to the restoration of a legally binding, sustainable, verifiable, and functional conventional arms control regime. The EU has also repeatedly expressed full support for the Open Skies Treaty and for the substantial modernisation of the Vienna Document. The EU’s position is that functioning and relevant arms control and CSBMs could increase military stability, transparency, and predictability in Europe, reducing threat perceptions and incrementally building up trust.

Chemical weapons

The EU actively promotes compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and provides important financial support to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). As the largest voluntary contributor to the OPCW, the EU funds initiatives aimed at the full implementation of the CWC. These initiatives include preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons, building capacity in CWC member states, expanding CWC membership, and combating impunity for the use of chemical weapons. The EU has also imposed restrictive measures on the Syrian regime and associated individuals in response to their chemical weapons use. Additionally, Russian and Syrian individuals implicated in chemical weapons attacks have been placed on a sanctions list.

Biological weapons

The EU promotes adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and has provided financial assistance, primarily for capacity-building activities in the Global South.

Space

The EU supports the peaceful use of outer space, adherence to international law, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Nuclear weapons

Most EU activities in the nuclear realm have focused on non-proliferation rather than on arms control or disarmament, largely due to internal disagreements on the latter. France is the only EU member state with nuclear weapons, while Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands host US forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Austria, Ireland, and Malta are party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which prohibits the production, transfer, threat, or use of nuclear weapons under any circumstance. This variation in attitudes towards nuclear weapons among EU member states has made it problematic for the EU to present a unified stance. This challenge was evident, for instance, in the EU’s inability to articulate common priorities ahead of the 2015 Review Conference of the NPT.

Footnotes

  1. See, for example, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/2/351526.pdf

  2. More detailed information can be found in learning units 02, 03, 05, 08 and 14.