Skip to content
Unit 12Export ControlChapter 5: The national implementation of export controls
All chapters
  1. 1. Introduction
  2. 2. Multilateral instruments and standards for arms export controls
  3. 3. Multilateral instruments and standards for dual-use export controls
  4. 4. The development of arms and dual-use export control instruments by and through the European Union
  5. 5. The national implementation of export controls
  6. 6. Summary and reflections on the future of export controls
Your bookmarks

When you add chapters to your bookmarks they'll appear here.

Chapter 5

The national implementation of export controls

Elements of a national control system

  • As a first step, states must adopt legislation to regulate arms and dual-use transfers, authorisation procedures, their enforcement and how to sanction any violations. This regulatory framework should also establish a ‘national control list’, i.e. a list of items that are subject to export controls.
  • The framework should also identify a competent authority responsible for issuing export authorisations or licences to companies and other entities (e.g. universities) for the transfer of arms or dual-use items. A decision on whether to grant a licence tends to be based on two factors: the end-use and the end-user within the destination country (which may give rise to specific risks or issues of political acceptability). Therefore, applicants usually have to provide information about the end-user and the end-use the items will be put to, as well as the type of items. This information will then be assessed by the licensing authority. For assessments that are particularly sensitive, an inter-agency committee can be set up with representatives from the defence, foreign policy, economic, intelligence agencies and/or ministries.1
  • To enforce the controls, several entities and methods are commonly used, including customs controls, border controls, telecommunications monitoring, criminal investigations and computer surveillance. A key element of enforcement is frequent checks at the borders, using trained customs officers with adequate resources and up-to-date procedures which allow them to selectively target some of the riskiest shipments. But these physical checks are not sufficient, especially with the increasing volume of ITT. Complementary investigative methods, such as intelligence gathering are therefore also used.
  • Authorities also raise awareness and conduct outreach activities among industry and other actors that could be subject to the controls. Outreach can focus on the applicable regulations as well as the risks that come with noncompliance, such as the proliferation of technologies which can be used in WMD, or the diversion of arms and ammunition to unintended end-users. Through outreach, the authorities can also establish a dialogue and communication channels with the actors subject to controls, and gain insights on the practical challenges they are facing.2 In addition to this, compliance and due diligence processes within companies are essential.3

Main actors

In a national export control system:

Licensing Authorities

Licensing authorities are the competent authorities responsible for issuing export authorisations or licences. In some countries, the competent authority is located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in others in the Ministry of Defence or Economy. In other countries, this authority is autonomous and not part of a particular ministry.

Customs and Law Enforcement

Customs, border control authorities and other law enforcement authorities such as the police are in charge of enforcing the controls, including at the state’s borders, and are involved in the investigation of export control violations.

Inter-Agency Committees

Relevant ministries and agencies in the fields of defence, foreign policy and economy usually participate in inter-agency committees to provide advice, or in many cases to jointly assess licence applications.

Parliaments

Parliaments are involved in drafting and adopting national legislation, and in some cases in the ratification of treaties and international commitments. In a very limited number of states, the parliament has a role in overseeing the implementation of national export control systems (for example through the work of specialised oversight committees). Many parliaments are also involved in the scrutiny of national reports on arms transfers, which they sometimes need to approve.

National Courts

National courts prosecute export control violations. In some states, national courts also play a role in examining challenges to state decisions to grant or approve licences.

In the transfer of arms and dual-use items:

Industry

Exporting companies, brokers and actors providing other services, such as traders, transport agents and freight forwarders; as well as banks and insurance companies.

Research Organisations

Universities and research institutes can also be subject to export controls. In particular, they can be involved in ITT through collaborative research projects and through the production and dissemination of their research findings.

Image not found (LU12_E2_inhalte_grafiken_25022025_LU_12_grafik5.svg)

Actors in a national export control system

Source: Grübelfabrik, CC BY-NC-SA

Controls throughout the transfer chain

States apply export controls before, during and after the transfer of arms or dual-use items:

Pre-transfer controls:

  • Context analysis and risk assessment by the competent authority, which considers a range of prohibitions and risks. Prohibitions are circumstances in which states must prohibit transfers of arms or dual-use items. They include UN arms embargoes (all UN member states), as well as EU arms embargoes for EU member states. When an export is not prohibited, the state assesses the potential risks that this export entails. The Wassenaar Arrangement good practices, the Arms Trade Treaty and the EU Common Position are useful in this regard as they clarify the application of standards relating to IHL/IHRL, economic development, conflict prevention and diversion, and promote harmonisation of national practices.4
  • Beyond this, states also take into account their own foreign and security and economic concerns, such as their industrial and political relations with foreign states and their wider foreign and security policy priorities.5

In-transfer controls:

  • arms and dual-use items are particularly vulnerable to diversion to illicit markets during their transfer, especially through transit and transshipment via third countries. A transit refers to the transportation of goods from a country of origin to a country of destination through the territory of a third country, during which the goods remain on board the transport facility (boat, plane, train or lorry). If they are unloaded and reloaded, this constitutes a particular type of transit called transshipment.6

Post-shipment controls:

  • the granting of authorisations may also be conditional on the acceptance of additional requests and guarantees by the recipient country, such as the signature upon delivery of the military materiel or the prior signature of a certificate confirming the presence of the agreed end-user of the materiel. Some countries also make it a condition that physical ‘post-shipment on-site inspections’ of the supplied items be carried out a few years after delivery.

Post-shipment on-site inspections

Post-shipment on-site inspections are one of the post-shipment control measures that some states have used to mitigate arms diversion risks. Post-shipment on-site inspections involve an exporting state requiring and then conducting physical checks on the territory of the importing state of military materiel the exporting state previously transferred.7 Such inspections can be helpful in verifying that an importing state is adhering to end-user assurances, as well as enabling a dialogue between importing and exporting states about measures to prevent diversion – thereby building trust and fostering cooperation.

Historically, the US has implemented several programmes which foresee post-shipment checks, including the Blue Lantern programme since 1990.8 These post-shipment checks can be carried out on all exports and are based on the extra-territorial application of US export controls. This is a very comprehensive approach, developed over a long period of time. In the last decade, a growing number of European states have also decided to adopt and start conducting on-site inspections. These states mostly use on-site inspections in a more targeted way, focusing on certain types of materiel and destinations where diversion risks are deemed to be higher.

Post-shipment on-site inspections are just one example of the many pre and post-shipment control measures that states can adopt. They also come with a range of challenges, including political sensitivities and resource constraints, which states that implement them need to address.9 Yet, states using this tool have highlighted that it can be an effective way to reinforce cooperation between importing and exporting states with a view to mitigating the risk of diversion

Quiz

Footnotes

  1. Davis, Ian. 2002. The regulation of arms and dual-use exports – Germany, Sweden and the UK. Oxford University Press ↩

  2. Viski, Andrea/ Jones, Scott. 2021. “Towards Outreach 2.0: Emerging Technologies and Effective Outreach Practices”, Strategic Trade Research Institute ↩

  3. Bauer, Sibylle/Bromley, Mark. 2019. “Detecting, Investigating and Prosecuting Export Control Violations: European Perspectives on Key Challenges and Good Practices”, SIPRI Report, SIPRI: Stockholm, December, available at: https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/1912_sipri_report_prosecuting_export_control_violations_0.pdf ↩

  4. Beijer, Paul. 2021. “Taking stock of the Arms Trade Treaty: application of the risk assessment criteria”, SIPRI: Stockholm, August, available at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/att_first_six_2_risk_beijer.pdf, pp. 1-12 ↩

  5. Bromley, Mark, 2022. “Understanding European Arms Export Controls - Material Interests and Competing Norms”, PhD diss., Stockholm University, available at: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1654783/FULLTEXT01.pdf ↩

  6. Cops, Diederik and Vanheuverswyn. 2022. “Under the radar – Transit of military goods – from licensing to control”, Flemish Peace Institute: Brussels, p. 13 ↩

  7. Varisco, Andrea Edoardo/Brockmann, Kolja/Robin, Lucile. 2020. “Post-shipment Control Measures: European Approaches to On-site Inspections of Exported Military Materiel”, SIPRI Background Paper, SIPRI: Stockholm ↩

  8. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2021. “End-Use Monitoring of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles”, Factsheet, January. https://www.state.gov/end-use-monitoring-of-u-s-origin-defense-articles/ ↩

  9. Bromley, Mark/Brockmann, Kolja/Varisco, Andrea Edoardo. 2021. “Post-shipment On-site Inspections of Military Materiel: Challenges and Responses”, SIPRI Policy Brief, SIPRI: Stockholm ↩

The EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament eLearning Course aims to cover all aspects of the EU non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. It's produced by PRIF with financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of individual learning units are the sole responsibility of the respective authors and don't necessariy reflect the position of the European Union.