Having discussed the different forms of arms control and the factors for its success, let us now take a look at the future of the arms control regime. Will there eventually be another golden age of arms control like the one we saw after the Cold War? Or are we destined to live in a world characterised by geopolitical competition and arms racing for decades to come?
As a general rule, arms control needs to be tailored to the state of international relations. When two nations are in conflict or are adversaries, the objectives and mechanisms of arms control may be significantly constrained, focusing primarily on curbing the risk of inadvertent conflict. The scope of arms control then increases with improving relations. Harald Müller, former head of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, developed the following model, which shows which arms control measures (understood in a very broad sense) are possible at which level of state relations.
| Level of conflict/ Degree of relations | Goal(s) of arms control | Means of arms control |
|---|---|---|
| Acute hostility | Ending acts of war Stabilising relationships | Increased communication between parties Mediation by third parties |
| Chronic hostility | Crisis stability Avoidance of preemptive pressures [situation during the Cold War] | Increased communication between parties Increased transparency |
| Mixed relationships | Stabilising relationships Crisis prevention [situation in Europe 1988–1992] | Confidence-building measures (CBMs) Quantitative and qualitative arms limitations Reduction of offensive capabilities |
| Predominantly cooperative relationships | Preventing residual mistrust from dominating relations [Europe after 1992] | More quantitative and qualitative arms limitations Enhanced transparency |
| Security community | Far-reaching military integration Purely national warfare no longer possible [Europe today?] | Joint defence planning Development of multinational forces |
Table based on: Müller, Harald. 1996. “Von Der Feindschaft Zur Sicherheitsgemeinschaft – Eine Neue Konzeption Der Rüstungskontrolle”, in: Meyer, Berthold (ed.), Eine Welt Oder Chaos?, Friedensanalysen 25. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 405–408, our translation.
One conclusion that can be drawn from the considerations underlying this table is that arms control must be adapted to the respective relationships in order to avoid the risk of failure from the outset. Overburdening arms control with expectations that it simply cannot fulfil at a given point in time does the concept a disservice and supports those who consider arms control to be nonsensical.
On the other hand, this model enables us to provide a tentative forecast, even though the future is of course always difficult to predict. The future of arms control will, in all likelihood, depend on whether or not some sort of political accomodation can be achieved between the great powers – Russia, China and the United States. When relations between states improve, military competition ceases to serve any meaningful political purpose – making comprehensive arms control agreements possible.1
One open question regarding the future of nuclear arms control remains whether the negotiation of nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union in a bipolar international system during the Cold War can be adapted to the current multipolar international system, where China is likely to emerge as a third major nuclear power due to its unconstrained nuclear build-up. In principle, however, multilateral arms control should be possible and history gives us cause for optimism here. The Washington Naval Treaty concluded in 1922, for example, limited the warships of five major military powers – the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan – according to a negotiated ratio. The caveat is that all these states were allies, not enemies, during World War I.
Until political accommodation between today’s major nuclear powers can be achieved, nuclear arms control will probably be conducted informally, without relying on legal treaties, without aggregate limits on weapons and perhaps even without formal negotiations between the competing parties. Existing multilateral arms control treaties, in particular the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, on the other hand, may well be more resilient to the new security environment due to almost universal global participation. Yet, even these arms control regimes might be held hostage by their most powerful members in pursuit of their own interests.
Lastly, humanitarian arms control generally follows a different logic than traditional arms control and is thus less likely to be as severely affected by geopolitical competition. Some of the states facing high-intensity military conflict due to a direct border with revisionary and aggressive military powers may consider leaving humanitarian arms control agreements such as the Convention on Cluster Munitions or the Mine Ban Treaty, but participation should remain relatively stable in the grand scheme of things.
Footnotes
-
Trachtenberg, Marc. 1991. “The Past and Future of Arms Control”, in: Daedalus 120 (1): 203–16. ↩