CBRN response training in the field.
Source: OPCW (CC BY-NC 2.0) https://flic.kr/p/LKUjxG
Just like any other treaty, the faces a number of challenges, which are linked to evolutions in science, technology, and industrial production processes, the emergence of new security actors, and pressures to develop new types of armament on the outer edges of the treaty’s scope.
Science, technology and industrial production processes
With the destruction of all declared CW completed, industry verification is now an increasingly important part of the OPCW’s responsibilities. It will also pose a formidable challenge to the OPCW. The chemical industry is very innovative, and how its production is now organised is quite different from when the treaty was concluded in the early 1990s.
One aspect is the design of new molecules. The Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) has reported that its database grows by 15,000 substances a day, and the average is still rising. Today, the CAS database comprises more than 183 million substances, many of which are toxic. Some are even much more toxic than the most poisonous chemical weapons, such as the nerve agents sarin and VX. Artificial intelligence will likely also have a significant impact on the design of new molecules, but the risks and threats it may pose to the are the subject of intense debate and scientific analysis.
Technological innovation affects not just product advances but also process improvements. New production methodologies mean that a factory is no longer limited to single manufacturing lines for certain chemicals. Modular approaches to production allow the fulfilment of precise batches tailored to demand. Factories can thus become more diversified or produce volumes that fall just under the reporting thresholds. Again, this challenges current verification arrangements.
The Technical Secretariat is aware of these challenges and is investigating how to improve the verification regime in order to prevent the emergence of chemical weapons in the future.
National implementation
State parties are the key to the ongoing success of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The ways in which each state party transposes the treaty requirements into national legislation and interacts with the various stakeholders in industry, the scientific community and civil society build the legitimacy for future investment in disarmament.
However, the goal of national implementation poses challenges, especially for developing countries. It is one of the most prominent areas for international cooperation. There are major programmes to help states that request assistance with the development of appropriate legislation. In addition, increasing sums are being invested in the education and training of scientists to meet the highest scientific standards, while also taking into account their moral and professional obligations under the .
This greatly benefits developing countries, and allows them to participate more fully in the future development of the treaty. Similar interactions with the chemical industry build stakeholdership, which is an important barrier against the potential, inadvertent involvement of these countries in the development and manufacture of chemical weapons.
Through its joint action programmes and Council Decisions, the European Union finances, among other things, OPCW programmes to improve national implementation legislation and international cooperation. As of January 2024, the European Union has provided 48.2 million euros to support the OPCW programmes since 2004 and to help finance the OPCW’s CW destruction, verification and investigation operations in Syria. One of the major joint programmes is centred on Africa. Following an EU Council decision in 2009, the EU started providing targeted support so that the OPCW could assist African states in meeting their treaty obligations. The OPCW runs the programme in cooperation with African regional organisations, including the African Union. The current Africa programme, which began in 2023, is currently in its sixth phase.
Addressing the terrorist threat
The Chemical Weapons Convention does not specifically address terrorism with CW. When Aum Shinrikyo used sarin nerve agent in Matsumoto (1994) and Tokyo (1995), the negotiation of the had already been concluded (1992), and the treaty had been opened for signature (January 1993), though it would not enter into force until April 1997. The terrorist attacks against the US on 11 September 2001, which were followed by letters containing anthrax spores sent to US senators and media outlets, increased anxiety about catastrophic terrorist attacks with toxic agents.
This does not mean that the OPCW (i.e. all the state parties to the ) and its Technical Secretariat cannot act to prevent terrorism with CW or mitigate the consequences of such an attack.
First, the imposes obligations on all state parties. The states are responsible for transposing those obligations into domestic law through criminal and penal legislation. In this way, the prohibitions become applicable to any legal or natural person, including terrorists or criminals seeking to acquire, develop,or use CW. With good domestic legislation, a state party can prevent an act of terrorism with CW from taking place.
Second, even with the word ‘terrorism’ absent from the treaty text, the Technical Secretariat can help state parties on various levels. The main areas are prevention and pre-emption. Before a terrorist incident takes place, the Technical Secretariat can assist a state party (at its request) with the development of effective national legislation. In addition, the Technical Secretariat can help strengthen national capacities to respond to and investigate incidents with toxic chemicals via regional or national chemical security and safety training and incident management exercises.
In the event of a terrorist incident involving toxic chemicals, a state party can request emergency assistance from the Technical Secretariat or ask it to investigate and evaluate the event.
The OPCW in the post-CW destruction stage
With the achievement of a key milestone in July 2023, namely the destruction of all declared chemical weapons, the entered a new phase of preventing the emergence and re-emergence of CW. The state parties had anticipated this new stage since the early 2010s, and since then they have made various decisions in preparation for the challenges of the future.
Four states – Egypt, Israel, North Korea and South Sudan – are not yet parties to the convention. Some are widely suspected of having CW stockpiles or advanced CW capabilities. The OPCW must, therefore, maintain its capacities and expertise to oversee and verify CW destruction operations in the event that the organisation expands its membership.
The civil war in Syria has clearly demonstrated that even if the ‘traditional’ agents, such as the nerve agent sarin and mustard agent, are eliminated under OPCW supervision, a regime might still wage chemical warfare by resorting to industrial toxic chemicals such as chlorine. Some regimes have now also deployed military-type toxicants to assassinate individuals domestically or abroad. These incidents (which are discussed below) highlight the need for the OPCW to maintain high levels of preparedness to assist state parties with investigations of CW use, forensic analysis, site remediation, medical support, consequence management or any other form of technical support if requested.
The Chemical Weapons Convention tasked the OPCW with monitoring scientific and technological developments and assessing their impact on the treaty’s objectives and purposes. To this end, the set up the Scientific Advisory Board. Another way the OPCW can approach these challenges is by co-opting partners and stakeholders in the convention, most notably from the scientific and industrial communities, so that they do not become inadvertent, unwilling participants in the development of new chemical weapons. Likewise, engagement with academia and other parts of civil society can help deepen knowledge of the norm against CW in the relevant communities. In December 2015, the OPCW decided to set up a new Advisory Board on Education and Outreach.
Addressing allegations of CW use: Case studies
Syria
Starting in early 2013, there were repeated allegations of CW being used during the Syrian civil war. Syria joined the in October 2013 in the aftermath of the Ghouta sarin strikes on 21 August. Consequently, the investigation of CW allegations in this context has two distinct phases.
Before Syria’s accession to the CWC, the UN Secretary-General activated his Investigative Mechanism in cooperation with the OPCW and World Health Organization (WHO). The UN team was in Damascus when Ghouta chemical attack took place. It proved the use of sarin. Subsequent investigations also confirmed some earlier CW claims.
While the OPCW was overseeing the elimination of Syria’s CW capacity, several accounts of chlorine attacks emerged in early 2014. Testimonials that helicopters had launched barrels containing chlorine pointed to government responsibility. The OPCW established a Fact-Finding Mission FFM in April 2014, whose investigative reports confirmed with a high degree of confidence that chlorine had been used as a weapon.
Multiple attacks with chlorine and the nerve agent sarin were reported between 2015 and 2018. The Syrian government bears responsibility for most incidents. However, during 2015, there were also sporadic reports of ISIL attacks using chemical warfare agents against Kurdish fighters in the north of the country, which intensified during the late spring and early summer. In August, mustard agent use by ISIL was reported. Again, investigations by the FFM confirmed CW use.
Based on the FFM reports, the OPCW strongly condemned chemical warfare. However, the organisation cannot attribute blame. The UNSC is directly involved in Syria’s CW disarmament and considers the monthly reports submitted by the OPCW, but cannot formally condemn the Syrian government given Russia’s backing. To resolve the issue, it created the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mission JIM tasked with identifying those responsible for the CW attacks. The JIM, however, could not hold individuals criminally responsible. In November 2017, Russia opposed the renewal of the JIM’s mandate in the UN Security Council, thereby ending a process of peer reviewing the OPCW’s analyses and the possibility of attributing responsibility for violating the norm against chemical warfare. What will happen with its findings is not made clear in the UNSC Resolution 2235 (2015) and other documents.
The UN General Assembly established the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to assist with investigations and the prosecution of persons who committed serious war crimes during the Syrian civil war. It is likely that the JIM’s assessments have been transferred to the IIIM.
Following the disbanding of the JIM, in a Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties held in June 2018, the OPCW adopted a contentious decision through majority voting to establish a mechanism within the Technical Secretariat to review the FFM reports and identify perpetrators.
The new Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) became fully operational in 2020. It issued its fourth report in February 2024. The first three reports confirmed CW use by Syrian forces; the fourth focused on the shelling of positions with mustard agent by ISIL.
In July 2020, the OPCW’s Executive Council initiated a non-compliance procedure against the Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the CWC. The Council requested the Syrian Arab Republic to, inter alia, declare the chemical weapons used in the March 2017 attacks as well as its remaining chemical weapons and to resolve all of the outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration.
In April 2021, the Conference of the States Parties determined the Syrian Arab Republic’s non-compliance with the and its failure to declare and destroy all of its chemical weapons. Thus, the Conference stripped Syria of the following rights and privileges under the CWC:
- To vote in the Conference and the Council
- To stand for election to the Council
- To hold any office of the Conference, the Council or any subsidiary organs
The real challenge for the future of the ban on CW is that, beyond investigations, the international community appears unable to react swiftly and decisively. The OPCW members have become deeply divided over the Syria dossier, with Syria’s backers, primarily Russia and Iran but also China, claiming that Syria has fulfilled its obligations as a state party and accusing the West of politicising the international organisation. As with earlier wars, there seem to be no clear paths for assigning criminal responsibility during or after the end of a war. This is a significant challenge for the OPCW and UN.
Assassination attempts with CW
Since 2017, three assassination operations involving a nerve agent have taken place. North Korea targeted Kim Jong-nam with binary VX at Kuala Lumpur International Airport, Malaysia. The half-brother of Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, died shortly after the exposure.
A year later, in March 2018, Russia mounted an assassination attempt with a Novichok agent on former Soviet/Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, UK. His daughter Yulia was also exposed to the neurotoxicant, which Russian operatives had applied to the front door handle of Skripal’s home. An intervening police officer also suffered the effects of exposure. All three individuals recovered after several weeks in hospital. However, in June of the same year, two British citizens had to be hospitalised in the nearby town of Amesbury following inadvertent exposure to Novichok after having recovered a vial discarded by the Russian operatives. One of the individuals died in July; the second recovered after hospitalisation.
In August 2020, Moscow attempted to eliminate Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny with a Novichok agent, presumed to have been in powdered form, at Tomsk airport, Russia. He survived and was eventually hospitalised in Berlin where he recovered. Russian authorities arrested Navalny upon his return to Moscow, after which he was imprisoned and eventually murdered in jail just ahead of the Russian elections in March 2024.
In each case, the OPCW can only act if the state party concerned requests assistance. North Korea is not a party to the CWC. Malaysia only requested a VX test kit from the Technical Secretariat to confirm its analyses. Except for providing a briefing to other state parties, it did not otherwise involve the OPCW.
The UK and Germany, where Navalny was treated, requested that the Technical Secretariat conduct in-country investigations to confirm their own findings. They made these requests under CWC Article VIII, paragraph 38(e) on technical assistance and evaluation, which includes evaluation of scheduled and unscheduled chemicals. The mission is called a Technical Assistance Visit rather than an investigation into alleged use. In such an event, the OPCW returns its findings to the requesting state party. Only the latter can decide whether to make the report available to other state parties. The suspected perpetrator of an act violating the is not involved. Russia repeatedly expressed its frustration over its exclusion from the Technical Assistance Visits and lack of access to its reports, adding to its grievances against the West. Endeavours to engage Russia on the assassination attempts via clarification requests under Article IX yielded no useful engagement, and no further efforts were pursued under the provision.
Allegations of CW use in Ukraine
Russia launched a full-scale invasion against Ukraine on 24 February 2022. It justified its action by referring, among other things, to preparations for chemical and biological warfare. Since then, both sides have accused each other of using toxic chemicals as a method of warfare.
Throughout 2023, reports surfaced about Russian forces using lachrymatory agents in combat operations, most often by dropping grenades from unmanned aerial vehicles. The allegations have increased considerably since December 2023, and Ukraine has submitted detailed reports to the Technical Secretariat with requests for assistance and investigations.
As a consequence of the war and the many allegations of CW use, members of the East European Group in the OPCW refused to endorse Russia’s nomination for the Executive Council, resulting in four candidacies for three vacancies. The full Conference of the State Parties, therefore, had to vote on the candidates, with Russia failing to reach the necessary quorum. Ukraine was elected.
Keeping the world interested in the CWC
The is of unlimited duration, but this does not mean that it will last into perpetuity. The treaty is a social construct, and as such, developments both inside and outside the regime may affect its relevance over time. Therefore, state parties must update the norm and practices in line with anticipated challenges and lessons learned from crises.
Verification matters
Chemical weapon destruction operations ended in July 2023. Despite this success, the ultimate destruction deadline of 2012 foreseen in the was missed by over a decade. This delayed the CWC’s transition into the post-destruction phase.
The delay impacted the future verification regime, as the primary focus should already have been on the prevention of future CW armament. This implies that the OPCW should pursue a new verification compact with the global chemical industry, including reporting modalities and onsite inspection routines. For the Technical Secretariat, this requires greater emphasis on an industry inspectorate rather than weapon experts, as well as permanent interaction with industry associations worldwide.
Updating the schedules
As explained in Chapter 3, the operates under the General Purpose Criterion (G), according to which prohibition is the default position, and a limited list of purposes is considered non-prohibited. For reporting and inspection activities, the GPC is too broad to make verification practical. Therefore, the includes three Schedules, i.e. lists of agents and precursors based on an assessment of their threat to the objectives and their commercial relevance.
The envisages a simplified amendment procedure for the Schedules (), but its application has proved politically difficult. Following the assassination attempt using a nerve agent from the so-called Novichok family in the UK, state parties moved, during the Conference of the States Parties in November 2019, to include the two principal families of Novichok agents as well as a family of carbamates that have a similar basis for toxicity under Schedule 1. The amendment became effective in June 2020.
Notwithstanding this amendment, the Schedules reflect past CW generations and may require updating in light of advancements in chemistry. Without such a modification, the verification regime will soon become obsolete. This would also shift the verification burden to developing countries as this type of chemical industry has tended to relocate to industrialising countries since the 1990s.
Keeping state parties involved
The involves many stakeholders: governments, industry, the scientitifc community, educators, civil society, etc. The OPCW must expand its outreach to these stakeholders on every continent, notably via training, education, youth engagement, building professional skills and expertise, professional codes, and extending into areas of chemical safety and security for populations. The Scientific Advisory Board and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach will play crucial roles in advising the Technical Secretariat and OPCW members in this regard.