The History of Chemical Warfare

The complexity of terrorist acquisition of chemical warfare agents

In the ‘toxic agent’ section above, it was noted that throughout the history of modern chemical warfare, the number of toxic chemicals selected and standardised for chemical warfare was very low relative to the number of known poisonous compounds. This was the consequence of two sets of factors:

• Any chemical warfare agent represented a compromise between various factors (e.g. ease of production, storage without degradation, physical properties after release, etc.)

• The mission-oriented selection of particular warfare agents (e.g. degree of volatility or lethality), in other words, the choice of a chemical warfare agent that best meets specific operational goals at a given point in time.

Terrorist entities cannot escape these factors once they decide to develop a chemical weapon capacity. They, too, need to balance their operational desires against the available scientific and technical skills and the production capacity they would be able to establish (e.g. laboratory, pilot plant or factory-level volumes). New elements will enter the equation as the programme scales up. Thus, for example, if a grouping limits its ambition – and therefore the demand on various skills and expertise – to laboratory synthesis of a single agent, then it will not have to invest resources in seeking technologies to stabilise the agent for long-term storage, which would be a requirement if the terrorist entity had opted for large-volume manufacture. While it is true that a terrorist entity can easily gain access to literature describing the chemical reactions, the processes require testing and fine-tuning at each and every level of the acquisition process. Different scales of activity also place different demands on the available skill sets. Thus, while the chemists in the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo managed to produce high-quality sarin in the laboratory, these individuals lacked the chemical engineering expertise needed for setting up and operating a pilot plant. Aum Shinrikyo never managed to get its factory up and running.

Whereas a state-run programme can research toxic chemicals, develop production methodologies and store stockpiles over decades, the luxury of time is something a terrorist entity never has. Moreover, contrary to a state, a terrorist grouping does not enjoy freedom from prosecution. A state can operate a secret programme hidden somewhere on its territory and no other government or authority has jurisdiction over the activities conducted within that state’s borders. A terrorist organisation, in contrast, operates on the territory of a country and government authorities are likely to have adopted and implemented a variety of legislative and criminal measures to counter the terrorist threat. The fear of raids on facilities is a major factor in terrorist decision-making. However, these counterterrorism measures also affect the grouping’s access to key raw materials, equipment and expertise, as various types of internal and international technology transfer controls inevitably create obstacles to setting up a secret chemical weapon programme within the borders of a given country.

The larger a chemical weapon programme becomes and the more people become involved, the greater the risks of breaches of secrecy or detection. Front operations need to be set up to provide a legitimate cover for acquiring certain types of chemical precursors or specialised equipment. Accidents may happen. Despite brainwashing, individuals working in the programme may start having misgivings or inadvertently divulge information about activities. Agents need to be field tested for their effectiveness and behaviour under realistic conditions. Large-volume production implies safe and secure storage facilities, which widen the footprint of the chemical weapon programme enormously.

While a terrorist organisation may opt to move its chemical weapon programme to the territory of a failed state or a state with poor internal controls, this decision creates different types of obstacles. Transport of sizeable agent volumes from the production location to the site of attack results in fresh logistical demands, which are informed by factors such as agent stability, transport opportunities, handler safety, secrecy and the need for enhanced intelligence about the target and local preparations, among many others.¹

A large chemical weapon programme would involve significant changes to the weapons acquisition process (indigenous production with growing risks of detection versus theft of weapons or black market purchases), lead to a reframing of the long-term strategic goals and identification of the specific roles of (and thus benefits from) chemical weapons, a shift of emphasis in the selection of primary targets, training and physical protection of group members, and the development of new security and safety procedures, all the while bearing in mind that sizeable chemical weapon production or storage would affect mobility and furtiveness. These changes can also be expected to have knock-on effects on the grouping’s organisational structure (e.g. to accommodate production and storage) and leadership organisation (e.g. placing scientific and technical experts in positions of authority and addressing internal rivalries resulting from their views on ideological questions or operational planning). In addition, they would have to acquire operational knowledge of technology purchasing or black market practices in unfamiliar settings.

Despite many scenarios and simulations of catastrophic terrorism with chemical warfare agents, the projections have not played out in reality. Aum Shinrikyo’s programme failed in all respects relative to the goals the group had set itself, namely taking over the Japanese government. The two sarin attacks in Matsumoto (1994) and Tokyo (1995) resulted in some fatalities and many other wounded, but the two incidents were indicative of failing strategic ambitions and the actions did not even achieve their immediate tactical objectives. Admittedly, several individuals and some organisations have since displayed interest in toxic substances, and in both Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has mounted attacks with chlorine-filled munitions and used mustard agents on a few occasions. However, on the whole, terrorist entities have shown little interest in warfare agents. The main explanation may be that terrorists have different goals than the military. Therefore, the question arises as to why the compromises that drove the selection of military agents should apply to them. If their purpose is to terrorise, then smaller volumes or different types of toxic chemicals – particularly ones that have fewer requirements in terms of access to materials and equipment, skill levels and organisational structure, and hence reduce risk of discovery – may serve their goals.

Thus, in several cases, we may observe groups or individuals acquiring or attempting to acquire small quantities of highly poisonous substances – in most instances, plant toxins, such as abrin or ricin, or commercially available toxicants, such as rat poison or acids. In other instances, a terrorist entity may resort to the opportunistic use of industrial toxicants. The former case typifies the so-called “lone wolf” terrorists, on the one hand, and individuals or activist groupings bearing a grudge against another individual, a company or organisation, or a specific section of society, on the other hand. The latter case occurs most often in wars or insurgencies when one of the parties draws on stocks in storage sites or chemical plants. The resort to chlorine manufactured and stored for water purification in the Syrian civil war and in Iraq is a typical example. Industrial toxic chemicals have also been deliberately released or threatened to be released into the environment to force government officials or company directors to accede to demands by protestors or domestic radicals.²

Catastrophic scenarios involving mass human casualties from terrorism with toxic agents are highly unlikely. Moreover, societies can take several measures to prevent such incidents or mitigate the worst consequences should they occur. Domestic legislation and regulations and their effective implementation, together with lawful law enforcement techniques, can disrupt the pursuit of chemical weapons before a terrorist entity or individuals come close to achieving such capacity. This is the responsibility of all states under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) or UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Furthermore, the development and implementation of chemical safety and security measures for production plants and storage facilities, as currently being promoted by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), reduce the possibility of opportunistic use of industrial toxic chemicals by terrorists, radicals or protestors, while advancing a culture of responsibility among scientists and professionals.