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Unit 6Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZ) and WMD-Free Zones (WMDFZ)Chapter 4: Open Issues
All chapters
  1. 1. Introduction
  2. 2. The History of the NWFZs
  3. 3. Current NWFZs – Common Elements and Individualities
  4. 4. Open Issues
  5. 5. Case Study - The debate about a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East
  6. 6. The EU and NWFZ/WMDFZ
  7. 7. Summary and Further Reading
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Chapter 4

Open Issues

Further NWFZ Proposals and Negative Security Assurances

In addition to the stalled debates about new NWFZs, there are currently intense discussions about the validity of the declarations of the nuclear weapon states vis-à-vis the individual NWFZs (i.e. the acceptance of the Additional Protocols) and about how far negative security (i.e. the commitment of nuclear weapon possessors not to attack or threaten to attack a non-nuclear weapon state with nuclear weapons) really extends. Not all nuclear weapon states have issued such guarantees to all NWFZs and ratified the corresponding additional protocols.

The following overview shows the status in summer 2024.

TlatelocoRarotongaBangkokPelindabaSemipalatinsk
United States+---+
United Kingdom++-++
France++-++
China++-++
Russia++-++

Table: Ratification Status of the NWFZ protocols – Negative Security Assurances of NWSs

The Idea of WMDFZ (Weapons of mass destruction-free zone)

The idea of „managing” all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is not restricted to the nuclear weapon-free-zone concept. For example, export control regulations in the European Union include both EU-wide restrictions covered by EU legislation, as well as EU Member State specific export controls set out at a national level. As a result, EU export control is performed on the basis of a combined list of the different WMD export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or the Australia Group. These mechanisms cover all materials, equipment and technologies falling under the respective export control lists. Another example is UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which was adopted unanimously in 2004 and aims to curtail the proliferation of all forms of weapons of mass destruction. This resolution requires all UN member states to develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

The idea of a WMDFZ was first raised in the specific circumstances of the Middle East,1 where the NWFZ proposal has been on the agenda since 1974, but it could not be realized due to the never publicly acknowledged Israeli nuclear weapon capability, the presence of nuclear weapon states in the region, the efforts of several Arab states (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq) to achieve nuclear weapons or establish a nuclear breakout capacity, and more recently, the Iranian nuclear program.2 Parallel to the failure of such efforts, Israel and many Arab states also ran chemical and/or biological weapons programs, to the effect that chemical weapons were often called “the nuclear bomb of the poor man”. (This can be refuted by the fact that those states that did develop a chemical weapon capability were typically the ones who also had a try at nuclear weapons.) Consequently, there seemed to be some kind of connection among the different categories of the WMD programmes whereby Arab states saw their chemical (and to a lesser extent biological) weapons programs as a countermeasure to the Israeli nuclear deterrent. These linkages made the proposal of a WMDFZ a rational arms control measure.

The resolution on the Middle East at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference called for “the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.” 3

The territory of the zone most probably would be the same as defined for the ME NWFZ, i.e. all League of Arab States members, plus Israel and Iran. The zone should also establish a mutually agreed verification mechanism. This is a very complex issue as most multilateral arms control treaties have their own specific verification organization - the IAEA for the nuclear, the OPCW for the chemical. In the meanwhile, biological weapons do not have an institutionalized verification mechanism, and there is no multilateral treaty to control WMD delivery vehicles, especially ballistic missiles. Therefore, such a zonal arrangement would require a new - combined - verification mechanism or procedure. In addition, due to the specific sensitivities and threat perceptions among the potential member states, a specific mechanism might also be needed. As an example, a WMD verification regime should build on the experience of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the IAEA multi-level set of verification mechanism, and the active and passive quota system included in the Open Skies Treaty (OST).

It should also be taken into account that the Middle Eastern WMDFZ in spite of several years of international efforts has still not been realized. However, since the first proposal for the zone was put forward, most potential member states have joined key multilateral arms control treaties (such as the NPT, the CTBT, the CWC, the BTWC), and some of these treaties came into effect after the ME WMDFZ was first proposed. Consequently, many aspects of the different WMD categories is already covered and verified under other agreements, and, outside of the Middle East region, there seems to be little rationale and/or political appetite to establish further WMDFZs, or to expand existing NWFZs into WMDFZs.

NPT not signedCTBT (Annex 2) not signedCTBT (Annex 2) signed, but not ratifiedTPNW signed and ratified (in the region)TPNW signed, but not ratified (in the region)CWC signed, but not ratifiedCWC not signedBTWC signed, but not ratifiedBTWC not signed
India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea (withdrawn), South SudanIndia, North Korea, PakistanEgypt, Iran, Israel, China, USComoros, PalestineAlgeria, Djibouti, Libya, SudanIsraelEgypt, North Korea, South SudanEgypt, Haiti, Somalia, Syria, TanzaniaChad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, Namibia, South Sudan, Tuvalu
4352 (out of 68 state parties)4 (out of the 27 signatories)13510

Quiz

Footnotes

  1. The detailed development of the concept see in Kelsey Davenport: WMD-free Middle East Proposal at a glance. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mewmdfz ↩

  2. For more information on the WMD pursuits of these states see: Nuclear Threat Initiative: Countries and Areas. https://www.nti.org/countries/ ↩

  3. Para 5. Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective; Para 6. Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Resolution on the Middle East, The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex Source: ↩

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