Outlook

Trends in missile proliferation

Moving into the future, missile proliferation is likely to continue at the current pace, if not accelerate. As outlined above, the reasons for this relate to both the demand and supply side of missile procurement. States recognise the military advantages that comprehensive and advanced missile arsenals provide them in conventional and nuclear war. At the same time, the number of missile-producing states has increased in recent decades, and missile manufacturing capability is likely to spread further. Moreover, traditional missile counter-proliferation tools lack proper means of enforcement and appear increasingly unequipped to deal with the dual-use nature of modern missile technology.¹

Importantly, this also relates to the inherent and growing dual-use nature of missile technology. As civilian high-technology companies proliferate across the world, the availability of missile-related technology on the civilian market will also increase. Moreover, as these civilian products become more sophisticated, their potential for use in military programmes will grow.

For example, due to Western sanctions and the inability to import high-tech products from the West, Russia has reportedly been repurposing gyroscopes from heavy agricultural equipment such as tractors for use in inertial navigation units guiding their 9M723 SRBMs. This would have been unthinkable a few decades ago, and although the quality of these improvised systems is unlikely to match that of military-grade products, it demonstrates the sophistication of many civilian dual-use goods today that are relatively freely available on the open market.

The landscape of missile manufacturing is also changing dramatically . Private space companies such as SpaceX build rockets that instead of placing satellites into orbit could, in theory, be repurposed to transport nuclear warheads into space, from where they could re-enter the atmosphere to hit a target. While there is no indication that SpaceX or similar companies are interested in this, or that governments would seek such services from private companies, it indicates that more and more individuals are being trained in a civilian technology sector with direct military applications – in this case, long-range ballistic missiles.²

At the same time, the seemingly insatiable demand for missiles has led to another group of disruptive actors entering the field: startups. Particularly in the United States, a growing amount of venture capital is flowing into the missile manufacturing sector. ³ These startups claim they can produce military missile systems that are as capable as, or even superior to, those made by traditional large manufacturers, all at a competitive price and on a faster timescale. For their development and production, these new companies often emphasise the use of novel industrial technologies and processes, such as additive manufacturing. Given that the missile industry is an extremely capital-intensive sector and missile manufacturing often relies on tacit knowledge, the success of these ventures remains uncertain. Nevertheless, if successful, the emergence of small, highly innovative companies could fundamentally transform the missile industry, potentially making the technology accessible to a broader range of actors.

Finally, when it comes to countering these proliferation trends that all point in one direction – more proliferation – it is important to also recognise the lack of motivation to reinvigorate the debate around missile counter-proliferation. Although efforts are occasionally made to raise the profile of the MTCR and HCoC, relatively little political capital is invested in pursuing these objectives. In general, missile counter-proliferation is no longer as much of a priority as it was.

Part of this relates to the fact that missile proliferation has been somewhat decoupled from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Initially, efforts to counter missile proliferation focused on hindering enemy WMD programmes by preventing the acquisition of effective delivery vehicles. Today, missile proliferation mainly involves acquiring weapon systems that offer advantages in conventional warfare. Stopping missile proliferation against the backdrop of what are legitimate efforts to bolster conventional self-defence capabilities, or can relatively easily be construed as such, provides for a much weaker normative basis to step in and limit states’ acquisition programmes.

The role of the EU

This has important implications for the EU and its member states. Missile proliferation will be difficult to stop. In fact, several EU member states are currently in the process of acquiring or developing new missile capabilities, and accord relatively high priority to these procurements. Given the need to prepare for a potential future confrontation with an increasingly aggressive and hostile Russia, this makes absolute sense.

The EU, through the European Defence Fund, allocates money for missile defence projects. In addition, several EU member states coordinate their procurement efforts to acquire missile defence (European Sky Shield Initiative – ESSI), as well as offensive counter-strike capabilities (European Long-Range Strike Approach – ELSA)⁴. Where possible and where it makes sense to do so, these efforts should be continued and expanded.

In addition, EU member states and EU institutions have played an important role in upholding norms and policies against the uncontrolled spread of missile technology, including in the fora and regimes outlined above. By providing a forum for coordination and harmonising export control laws, the EU has played and continues to play a key role in this.

In the future, the EU and its member states would be well advised to expand their missile-related efforts both in terms of missile procurement activities and counter-proliferation policies.

First, the EU is home to a relatively large missile-producing industry that remains internationally competitive, although market share has been lost to US, South Korean and Israeli manufacturers in recent decades. From a strategic autonomy perspective, retaining and expanding this industry is of great importance. Where possible, the EU should promote the competitiveness of this industry and missile-related sectors.⁵ This would also be important in terms of Europe’s nascent space industry which continues to lag behind the United States, China and other international actors.

Second, missile-related counter-proliferation will remain paramount to the EU and member states, and will perhaps increasingly focus on non-state actors. Recent events in the Red Sea, where Houthi rebels equipped with modern missile capabilities have disrupted international shipping, highlight the significant threat posed by missile proliferation to these types of actors. Stopping such instances of proliferation should be a major priority for EU member states in the future. This entails limiting the spread of missile technology that could facilitate proliferation to non-state actors, but also punishing states and organisations that engage in such behaviour, including through EU sanctions. The latter will likely become increasingly important given that, as outlined above, missile manufacturing capability has already spread far and wide and are anticipated to continue to do so in the future. Addressing the root cause of the problem may therefore no longer be a feasible option and tackling the symptoms may become the more viable path going forward.

Third, European member states have supported, and to some extent continue to support, the missile programmes of systemic rivals and potential adversaries, such as Russia, China and North Korea, for example. ⁶ While member states have not directly provided these countries with missile capabilities, missile production tools and technologies from the EU, some of which arrived at their destinations via third-country detours, have greatly contributed to their missile programmes. For example, Western precision manufacturing tools that have been exported to Russia, including from EU countries, continue to facilitate Russia’s missile war against Ukraine’s population centres and critical civilian infrastructure. Member states must become more cautious about providing such technologies to third parties and consider their potential end-uses more thoroughly. The EU can potentially play an important role in setting standards harmonising export control rules, as well as pressuring third countries to follow suit.

Footnotes

1. Lauriane Héau and Kolja Brockmann, Intangible Transfers of Technology and Software: Challenges for the Missile Technology Control Regime (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2024), https://doi.org/10.55163/HLWP1722. ↩

2. Kolja Brockmann and Lauriane Héau, Developing Good Practices in Export Control Outreach to the NewSpace Industry (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2023), https://doi.org/10.55163/BQAO1685. ↩

3. Y Combinator, Ares Industries: Building Low-Cost Cruise Missiles, https://www.ycombinator.com/companies/ares-industries ↩

4. German Ministry of Defence, European Sky Shield - Overview of the Initiative, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/european-sky-shield-die-initiative-im-ueberblick-5511066; European Nations Collaborate on Long-Range Precision Strike Capabilities, Defence Industry Europe, 2024, https://defence-industry.eu/european-nations-collaborate-on-long-range-precision-strike-capabilities/ ↩

5. Fabian Hoffmann, Europe’s Missile Conundrum, War on the Rocks, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/europes-missile-conundrum/ ↩

6. Amy Mackinnon, Russia’s War Machine Runs on Western Parts, Foreign Policy, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/22/russia-sanctions-weapons-ukraine-war-military-semiconductors/. ↩