States have generally demonstrated an interest in limiting the proliferation of missiles and regulating their most destabilising implications. This pertains especially to longer-range missiles that could be suitable delivery vehicles for chemical, biological or nuclear warheads.
As a result, state actors have included missile technologies in several binding arms control agreements, especially those related to nuclear weapons. They established treaties with stringent regulations on missile technology, such as the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms resulting from the SALT I negotiations, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the New START Treaty.
In addition, state actors devised a range of missile counter-proliferation tools designed to stop or at least slow down the global spread of missiles by creating several voluntary export control regimes and confidence-building measures surrounding the acquisition, deployment and use of missile technologies, including dual-use components. These include the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Hague Code of Conduct, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group.
The following section looks at these arms control treaties and counter-proliferation tools in more detail. The section starts by discussing landmark treaties that comprehensively regulated the deployment and use of missile technology before reviewing voluntary agreements related to missile technology counter-proliferation.
Legally binding agreements
Binding political agreements impose legally enforceable obligations on member states, with established mechanisms for accountability and consequences for violations. In the context of missile proliferation, three politically binding agreements are of particular importance: The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the New START Treaty (as well as its predecessor).
The primary goal of these treaties was not to curb missile proliferation but to ensure strategic stability between participating states in the nuclear domain. Further, since 2019, the INF Treaty has no longer been in force, and the New START Treaty is in a precarious state after Russia announced in February 2023 that it was suspending its participation. Nevertheless, the treaties mentioned in this section have played an important role in shaping the global missile landscape of the 21st century.
SALT I and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms
The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in 1972 as part of the broader Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), was the first major instrument of control between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (see also LU20). This agreement aimed to cap the escalating arms race, particularly the proliferation of strategic ballistic missile technology.
The agreement specifically regulated the deployment of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which were the primary means of delivering strategic nuclear warheads across vast distances. Under the terms of the Interim Agreement, both Cold War superpowers agreed to freeze the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers at the levels that were either operational or under construction as of 1 July 1972. The United States was allowed to retain 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs, while the Soviet Union was permitted 1,618 ICBM launchers and 740 SLBM. 1 These limits reflected the existing strategic balance, with the Soviet Union having a larger number of ICBMs and the United States maintaining a superior number of SLBMs.
As such, the Interim Agreement played an important role in curbing the vertical proliferation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, particularly ICBMs and SLBMs, in the arsenals of the participating states. However, it did not address MIRV technology, which was beginning to enter into service on a larger scale at the time. Consequently, while the agreement limited the growth of strategic missile launcher capabilities in American and Soviet arsenals, it did not prevent the overall increase in the number of strategic nuclear warheads.
The Interim Agreement was intended to have a duration of five years and was thus due to expire in October 1977. However, both sides continued to abide by its provisions beyond this date until the SALT II agreement was signed in 1979, though SALT II was never ratified by the United States Senate due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Despite the lack of ratification, both countries largely observed the terms of SALT II until it was superseded by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991 (see also LU20).
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a central part of the global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote cooperation in peacful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of nuclear and general disarmament.
Current Adoption
Data: UNODA Treaties Database
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
The INF Treaty, signed in 1987 by the United States and the Soviet Union, aimed to eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres, along with their launchers. 2 Its purpose was to reduce the threat of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, which were seen as posing a significant risk to strategic stability because of their short flight time and the minimal warning time they provide. By 1991, nearly 2,700 missiles had been destroyed, including the well-known American Pershing II and Soviet RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20 Saber) IRBMs.
The INF Treaty significantly reshaped the missile landscape by eliminating large parts of ground-launched missile arsenals in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. However, its influence persisted long after the Cold War because the treaty not only temporarily reduced missile stockpiles but completely banned a specific class of missiles. As a result, countries ceased developing and producing ground-launched intermediate-range missile capabilities, at least until Russia violated the treaty by developing the 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile (SS-C-8 Screwdriver), which fell within the range limitations of the INF Treaty.
As such, the INF Treaty significantly reduced the demand for ground-launched missile systems within NATO and beyond, dramatically curbing both their vertical and horizontal proliferation. Since the treaty’s demise, NATO member states, particularly the United States, have scrambled to rebuild missile systems that had previously been banned. Efforts include the American precision strike missile, or short PrSM, an SRBM with a range of 499 to 1,000 km (depending on the variant), a containerised ground-launched Tomahawk variant, and a joint European project for a ground-launched cruise missile with a range of over 1,000 km, for example.
This indicates that the effects of the INF Treaty on missile proliferation, while significant, were only of a temporary nature. This is especially the case since the war in Ukraine has highlighted the military utility of ground-launched missile systems with ranges of 500 kilometres or more.3
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was a landmark arms control agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on December 8, 1987. It aimed to eliminate both nations' land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The treaty resulted in the destruction of 2,692 missiles and included extensive verification measures, fostering trust during the Cold War. However, the treaty faced challenges due to alleged violations, leading to the U.S.'s withdrawal in 2019. Despite its termination, the INF Treaty set a precedent for arms control negotiations and efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear-capable missile systems.
Current Adoption
New START Treaty
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), effective since 2011 between the United States and Russia, limits each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 deployed strategic nuclear launchers (ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers). It also caps the total number of deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear launchers at 800. 4 The treaty includes extensive verification measures such as on-site inspections, data exchanges and notifications to ensure compliance. New START is the successor to the 1991 START Treaty. As mentioned above, the 1991 treaty succeeded the 1972 Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms and reduced the deployment levels of strategic delivery vehicles to 1,600, with a maximum of 6,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
Similar to the INF Treaty, the primary objective of the New START Treaty is to maintain and enhance strategic stability between participating states. This goal is pursued by alleviating arms race pressures through mutually agreed limits on strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. New START reduced the need to build additional strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, including ICBMs and SLBMs. It also reduces the need to develop specific missile technologies like MIRVs, as the ratio of nuclear warheads to missiles and bombers renders MIRV technology less important. For example, the Mk-12A re-entry vehicle deployed on the American LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBM could theoretically carry up to three warheads. However, at present, each re-entry vehicle carries only one to comply with New START limits.
Since Russia announced its intention to suspend its participation in the treaty in February 2023, New START faces an uncertain future. This has made vertical proliferation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads more likely, although neither the United States nor Russia have publicly acknowledged a desire to go beyond the treaty’s deployment limits. Given China’s nuclear expansion and the growing Russian threat, the United States is likely to face mounting pressure to engage in vertical proliferation efforts. Depending on the future expansion of ICBM and SLBM arsenals in both Russia and the United States, the missile-related counter-proliferation benefits of the New START Treaty and its predecessor may be temporary.
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
The New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) is a bilateral arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, signed on April 8, 2010, in Prague. It limits each country to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads, 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, as well as 800 total launchers. The treaty includes robust verification measures, such as data exchanges, on-site inspections, and notifications to ensure compliance. It builds on previous arms control agreements to promote strategic stability. Originally set to expire in 2021, it was extended for five years until February 2026, remaining a critical framework for reducing nuclear arsenals.
Current Adoption
Voluntary agreements
Voluntary political agreements depend on the goodwill and commitment of participating states to follow the agreed-upon guidelines. Although compliance can be enforced externally, such as through sanctions or political pressure, these agreements lack internal enforcement mechanisms. Additionally, they confer rights and duties only to member states and do not automatically apply to non-member states.
In the context of missile technology and missile non-proliferation, four voluntary agreements are particularly important: The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), the Wassenaar Agreement and the Australia Group.
The MTCR is arguably the most important for preventing missile proliferation, covering a broad range of missile-related technology transfers. The HCoC is a trust- and confidence-building measure focused particularly on ballistic missiles. While not an export control regime, the HCoC has contributed to missile non-proliferation by advancing a norm against ballistic missile proliferation. The Wassenaar Agreement and the Australia Group complement the MTCR and HCoC by enhancing the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of missile technology export controls and providing platforms for international exchange
Missile Technology Control Regime
Established in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary partnership among countries seeking to prevent the proliferation of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technology capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Membership originally comprised seven countries with advanced industrial and missile manufacturing capabilities but has since grown to 35 member states.
The MTCR provides guidelines for controlling the export of missile-related technology. The MTCR Annex comprises a detailed list of items subject to export controls, divided into two categories based on their sensitivity and potential impact on missile proliferation.5
- Category I items: Complete missile systems (including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, long-range OWA drones) with the capability to deliver a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km, as well as major subsystems (e.g. rocket boosters, RVs or guidance kits).
- Category II items: Less sensitive and dual-use missile-related components and technology, including propulsion systems, propellants, structural materials, navigation systems and related technologies that could be used in missile development but also have civilian applications.
Exports of Category I items are subject to a strong presumption of denial. This means that the default position is to deny export licenses for these items and approval is only considered under rare and exceptional circumstances. In the rare instances where an export license is granted for a Category I item, it typically involves stringent conditions, such as assurances regarding end-use and safeguards against diversion to unauthorised uses or third parties. In contrast, while Category II items are controlled, there is more flexibility regarding their export, allowing for case-by-case evaluations based on risk assessments.
The MTCR has been relatively effective in establishing a common framework for controlling missile technology exports. However, several challenges remain:6
- No enforcement mechanism: The MTCR is a voluntary regime without binding enforcement mechanisms. Compliance relies on the goodwill and commitment of member states.
- Non-member states: Some significant missile technology holders and proliferators, including China (though it claims to adhere to MTCR guidelines), North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and Israel, are not members of the MTCR, limiting its global reach.
- Dual-use technologies: The proliferation of missile-related dual-use technologies, which have both civilian and military applications, complicates export control efforts.
- Variable national controls: Differences in the national implementation and enforcement of the MTCR guidelines can create gaps and inconsistencies. For example, in the early 2000s, France exported land-attack cruise missiles to the United Arab Emirates, a move that was met with strong objections from the United States on the basis of the MTCR.7
Overall, the MTCR has been moderately effective in curbing missile proliferation by establishing guidelines and fostering international cooperation to control the export of missile-related technologies. It has successfully restricted access to key missile technologies on the global market. However, challenges persist, and its future relevance is uncertain, most notably due to the horizontalisation of missile-related manufacturing capabilities and the growing significance of missile-related dual-use items that are difficult to control.8
Missile Technology Control Regime
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a multilateral, voluntary partnership to prevent the proliferation of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It focuses on controlling exports of missiles, equipment, software, and technology for missiles.
The Missile Technology Control Regime focuses on controlling exports of missiles, equipment, software, and technology for missiles falling into two categories
- Category I: Includes complete missile systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets) with capabilities exceeding a 300km/500kg range/payload threshold; This category also includes major subsystems, and production facilities, with the strictest controls to discourage export entirely except under rare circumstances.
- Category II: Covers less sensitive items like complete missile systems not falling under category I with a maximum range equal to or greater than, 300km, as well as components and dual-use technologies, allowing more flexibility under carefully evaluated conditions.
A comprehensive “Equipment, Software and Technology Annex” covers the two categories in more detail. Though not legally binding, the MTCR has significantly influenced international efforts to curb the spread of missile technologies, promoting global security and non-proliferation.
There are currently 35 countries that are members (Partners) of the MTCR, with the date in brackets represents the initial year of membership: Argentina (1993); Australia (1990); Austria (1991); Belgium (1990); Brazil (1995); Bulgaria (2004); Canada (1987); Czech Republic (1998); Denmark (1990); Finland (1991); France (1987); Germany (1987); Greece 1992); Hungary (1993); Iceland (1993); India (2016); Ireland (1992); Italy (1987); Japan (1987); Luxemburg (1990); Netherlands (1990); New Zealand (1991); Norway (1990); Poland (1998); Portugal (1992); Republic of Korea (2001); Russian Federation (1995); South Africa (1995); Spain (1990); Sweden (1991); Switzerland (1992); Turkey (1997); Ukraine (1998); United Kingdom (1987); United States of America (1987).
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) aims to address the global security challenges posed by the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. The HCoC seeks to promote transparency, confidence-building, and restraint in the development and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. 9 The code is not legally binding but represents a political commitment by its subscribing states to adhere to its principles and guidelines. The HCoC was adopted in 2002 by 96 states. Since then, membership has grown to 140 states.
Member states commit to exercising restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missile technologies capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. This includes refraining from transferring technology that could contribute to the development or enhancement of such missiles.
In addition, the HCoC serves as an important transparency and confidence-building measure by facilitating pre-launch notifications for ballistic missile and space-launch vehicles (SLV), as well as the exchange of information related to ballistic missile programmes:
- Pre-launch notifications: Member states are encouraged to provide advance notification of planned ballistic missile launches, including SLVs, to enhance transparency and reduce misperceptions.
- Exchange of information: States are encouraged to exchange information on their ballistic missile policies, programmes and activities through confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as annual declarations and notifications of significant changes.
Similar to the MTCR, challenges to the HCoC’s effectiveness largely relate to its non-binding nature, implementation and limited membership:
- Non-binding nature: Much like the MTCR, the HCoC is only a politically binding commitment and compliance with its provisions is voluntary. There are no legally binding enforcement mechanisms.
- Implementation challenges: The effectiveness of the HCoC relies heavily on the willingness of member states to voluntarily implement its guidelines and transparency and confidence-building measures. For example, Russia has been criticised in the past for not providing timely or detailed notification of missile tests.
- Limited membership: Important non-member states and entities outside the regime’s scope continue to engage in missile proliferation activities, undermining the code’s objectives. Several states with significant ballistic missile programmes and arsenals, such as China, North Korea, Pakistan and Iran, remain outside the HCoC’s membership.
The HCoC’s future appears uncertain. Although there have been efforts to develop the code into a legally binding instrument, these efforts have not proven successful. In addition, the war in Ukraine has reinforced the military utility of ballistic missiles, likely increasing demand for the technology in the future. Nevertheless, the HCoC has played a role in creating a norm against ballistic missile proliferation and enhancing transparency between participating member states.
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) is a multilateral, voluntary initiative aimed at preventing the spread of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Established in 2002, it complements existing non-proliferation measures like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The HCoC promotes transparency and confidence-building through annual declarations on ballistic missile and space-launch programs, as well as pre-launch notifications. While not legally binding, it encourages responsible behavior among its 145 subscribing states, serving as a critical tool for global security by fostering dialogue and cooperation to limit the proliferation of missile technologies.
Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group
The Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group are international export control regimes that, while not exclusively focused on missile proliferation, play complementary roles in curbing the spread of missile-related technologies. Both regimes work alongside the MTCR and the HCoC to enhance global missile non-proliferation efforts.
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is a multilateral export control regime with 42 participating states. It was established in 1996 to promote transparency and responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.
The Wassenaar Arrangement maintains detailed control lists of dual-use goods and technologies, including items relevant to missile development, such as precision machine tools, electronics and materials. By controlling the export of these dual-use items, the Wassenaar Arrangement helps prevent their diversion for use in missile programmes.
Wassenaar Arrangement
The Wassenaar Arrangement is a multilateral export control regime established on July 12, 1996, in Wassenaar, Netherlands. It aims to promote transparency and responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thereby preventing destabilizing accumulations. Participating states implement national policies to ensure that such transfers do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that undermine regional and international security. The Arrangement facilitates information exchange on transfers and denials of specified controlled items to non-participating states, enhancing cooperation among members. It is not legally binding and decisions are made by consensus. The Wassenaar Arrangement's Secretariat is located in Vienna, Austria.
The Australia Group is an informal forum of countries established in 1985 to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons. It currently has 43 member countries that coordinate export controls on chemical and biological materials, equipment and technologies.
The Australia Group’s control lists include precursor chemicals and biological agents that could be used in the manufacture of chemical or biological warheads for missiles. Controlling the export of these items reduces the risk of them being used in missile-delivered chemical or biological weapons. Member states harmonise their national export controls based on agreed guidelines to make sure that items critical to missile-related weapons of mass destruction programmes are tightly regulated.
Australia Group
The Australia Group (AG) is a multilateral export control regime formed in June 1985 to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. It harmonizes export controls among member countries to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of such weapons. The AG maintains control lists of chemicals, biological agents, and related equipment that could be misused for weapons production. Members commit to implementing these controls and sharing information to enhance global security. The group convenes annually to review and update its control measures in response to emerging threats.
Member States of the Australia Group
Data: Natual Earth. Graphic: PRIF
Overall, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group play an important role in curbing missile proliferation by controlling dual-use technologies, materials and equipment that could contribute to missile programmes. Their efforts complement the MTCR’s focus on missile technology export control and the HCoC’s transparency and confidence-building measures. These regimes increase the robustness of the global missile non-proliferation framework by addressing gaps and controlling otherwise unmonitored materials and technologies. Further, they offer additional platforms for information exchange and coordination.
Footnotes
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Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation, Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S. Department of State, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4795.htm. ↩
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Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), U.S. Department of State, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm. ↩
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Jonas Schneider and Torben Arnold, Significant and Sound: US Medium-Range Missiles in Germany, SWP Comment, 2024, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024C30/#:~:text=At%20the%20NATO%20summit%20in,reach%20targets%20in%20Russia’s%20heartland ↩
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Bureau of Arms Contro, Deterrence, and Stability, New START Trearty, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/new-start/. ↩
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Missile Technology Control Regime, Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers, https://www.mtcr.info/en/mtcr-guidelines/guidelines-for-transfer. ↩
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William Alberque, Revitalising Arms Control: The MTCR and the HCoC (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022), https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content—migration/files/research-papers/iiss_revitalising-arms-control-the-mtcr-and-the-hcoc_mdi-02112021.pdf. ↩
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Jeffrey Lewis, Storm Shadow, Saudi, and the MTCR, Arms Control Wonk, 2011, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/204051/saudi-arabia-storm-shadow-the-mtcr/. ↩
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Kolja Brockmann, Dr Mark Bromley and Lauriane Héau, The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Crossroads: Adapting the Regime for Current and Future Challenges (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2022), https://doi.org/10.55163/YCVA4831 ↩
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Hague Code of Conduct, Background Documents, https://www.hcoc.at/background-documents/text-of-the-hcoc.html ↩