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Unit 14European Union Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament PoliciesChapter 5: Conclusions and outlook
All chapters
  1. 1. The institutional set-up of EU policies on non-proliferation and disarmament
  2. 2. The evolution of EU policy of non-proliferation and disarmament
  3. 3. EU non-proliferation policies in detail: The fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
  4. 4. The EU in international arms control negotiations
  5. 5. Conclusions and outlook
  6. 6. References and further readings
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Chapter 5

Conclusions and outlook

Conclusions and outlook

Since the adoption of the EU WMD Strategy, the Union has consolidated its non-proliferation policy, strengthening the traditional areas of focus of multilateralism, technical cooperation and, to a lesser extent, political conditionality. Notably, it developed institutional and financial capabilities in both the Council and Commission and, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EEAS to reinforce the implementation of its policies. In the Iranian crisis, the distinctive institutional framework of the E3/EU enabled the EU to adopt a leading role in one of the most prominent international security issues of the time. This was significant from the perspective of European non-proliferation policies but also for the development of CFSP and for the EU as an international actor. Nevertheless, the EU is still far from being a fully-fledged non-proliferation actor. Although all member states agree on the desirability of non-proliferation, they are still divided on related issues. A divide over nuclear disarmament, already perceptible when the Strategy was adopted1, became more patent with the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW): While NATO members openly reject it, traditional disarmament advocates Austria and Ireland are among its champions.

Drawing of various unspecified actors sitting in front of an EU flag and arguing about a ban on nuclear weapons.

Source: Grübelfabrik, CC BY-NC-SA

Based on the existing record, we can venture to express the following expectations about the future development of the EU’s role in the field. Firstly, the member states that acceded in the framework of the fourth and fifth enlargement integrated seamlessly into the NATO mainstream, without affecting the general trends visible in the EU at 15. Secondly, the division over nuclear deterrence is likely to persist, given the entrenched nature of the prevailing positions. Within the EU, two groups have consolidated, acquiring a format that approximates the pattern of ‘differentiation’, i.e. the formation of two or more semi-permanent groups with homogenous policy preferences, which prevails in other policy fields.1 At the same time, it will be interesting to watch how the positions of Finland and Sweden, traditional and moderate disarmament proponents, will evolve following their recent NATO accession. They may become indistinguishable from the rest of the group protected by the umbrella, or they may form a cluster of countries within NATO more favourable to progress on disarmament than the average. Lastly, the EU can be expected to continue raising its profile in other fields of arms control in the context it knows best: treaty talks, replicating episodes such as the negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty or the management of the Iran crisis up to the signature of the JCPOA.

Footnotes

  1. Onderco and Portela 2023 ↩ ↩2

The EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament eLearning Course aims to cover all aspects of the EU non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. It's produced by PRIF with financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of individual learning units are the sole responsibility of the respective authors and don't necessariy reflect the position of the European Union.