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Unit 5Nuclear Weapons 2 - Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Peaceful UsesChapter 4: The NPT over time: The NPT Review Cycle
All chapters
  1. 1. Introduction and overview
  2. 2. History of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: From the bomb to the NPT
  3. 3. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
  4. 4. The NPT over time: The NPT Review Cycle
  5. 5. Implementation of non-proliferation
  6. 6. Controversies
  7. 7. The European Union and the nuclear non-proliferation regime
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Chapter 4

The NPT over time: The NPT Review Cycle

Art. VIII.3 and the PrepCom

Article VIII.3 of the NPT stipulated that five years after the treaty’s entry into force, state parties should hold a conference aimed at reviewing its operation.1 In May 1975, therefore, NPT members held the first Review Conference (RevCon). Since then, every five years, state parties have held a RevCon intended to review the implementation of the NPT over the preceding five years.

Each RevCon is conducted under three Main Committees, which respectively reflect Articles VI, I-II-III and IV of the treaty. Main Committee I is on disarmament, Main Committee II is on non-proliferation and Main Committee III is on peaceful uses of nuclear technology. A General Committee coordinates the work of the three Main Committees.

In between RevCons, state parties meet for what are known as Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings, aimed at addressing substantive and procedural matters ahead of the Conference. Since 1995, state parties have met for an annual ten-day PrepCom meeting for the three years preceding the RevCon. Normally, a RevCon would be preceded by three PrepCom meetings – with the sole exception of the 1995 Conference, for which state parties met a fourth time, in the same year of the RevCon, in order to resolve outstanding issues.

UN Headquarter in New York City from across the East River.

The UN Headquarter in New York City

Source: Kidfly182/Wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference

The 1995 RevCon, which took place at the UN Headquarters in New York from 17 April until 12 May 1995, marked a turning point. Despite being unable to adopt a Final Document, state parties negotiated what was referred to as a ‘package deal’ consisting of three Decisions and one Resolution.

  • Decision 12: To strengthen the review process for the treaty. State parties decided a RevCon should be held every five years, and that ten-day PrepCom meetings should occur annually in each of the three years prior to the RevCon. They also confirmed the three Main Committees structure of the Conference.

  • Decision 23: Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. More specifically, state parties agreed that:

    • universal adherence to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was an urgent priority;
    • every effort had to be made to implement the NPT in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
    • the treaty’s undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament were to be fulfilled with determination;
    • NPT members should work towards the establishment of internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free zones;
    • an internationally legally binding instrument could have prevented the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
    • the IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards agreements with NPT state parties;
    • particular attention should have been directed towards the right of all NPT state parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

  • Decision 34: Indefinite extension of the NPT. Concern over this decision was expressed by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in particular, as they feared that the indefinite extension of the treaty would enable nuclear-armed states to hold on to their arsenals and abdicate any responsibility for eliminating them. Yet, the majority voted for the NPT extension.5

Lastly, through the Resolution on the Middle East6, NPT members commit to the enforcement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process; encourage all the states of that region which are not yet NPT state parties to sign the treaty and place all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; and appeals to Middle Eastern states to take practical steps towards the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Achievements over the years

After the 1995 RevCon, NPT state parties continued to hold a RevCon at the UN Headquarters in New York every five years. While some Conferences were able to reach a consensus over a Final Document, others failed to fulfil this objective.

The 2000 RevCon ended with the adoption of a Final Document7, which was mostly made possible by the negotiation of a group of middle powers known as the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)8. The group encompassed foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden (Slovenia and Sweden later withdrew from the NAC). The document listed 13 practical steps9 to advance nuclear disarmament:

  • Utmost effort to achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
  • Moratorium on nuclear explosions
  • Importance of negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT);
  • Role of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and necessity to create a subsidiary body with a mandate on nuclear disarmament
  • Unequivocal undertaking from NWS to accomplish complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals
  • Entry into force and implementation of START II, conclusion of START III and preservation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty)
  • Establishment and implementation of a Trilateral Initiative between the US, Russia and the IAEA
  • A series of steps for all NWS to adopt in order to accomplish nuclear disarmament:
    1. Further unilateral reductions
    2. Increased transparency
    3. Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs)
    4. Agreement over measures to reduce operational status of nuclear weapons (NW)
    5. Agreement over reducing the role of NW in security policies
    6. Engagement by NWS in the process leading towards the complete elimination of NW
  • Agreement of all NWS to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under the control of the IAEA or other relevant international verification arrangements
  • Reaffirmation of the principle of general and complete disarmament
  • Agreement to conduct regular reporting on progress in nuclear disarmament
  • Further development of verification mechanisms for nuclear disarmament

The 2005 RevCon failed to produce an agreed action plan to achieve nuclear disarmament. State parties demonstrated polarised views on disarmament, and they could not agree on a Final Document. NWS showed a complete lack of willingness to discuss the matter of disarmament, which caused a procedural stalemate during the Conference, leaving insufficient time to reach consensus on relevant matters. An additional source of concern was the fact that the US did not send a high-level delegation to the Conference, which signalled a lack of trust in the process and therefore in the goal of the Conference itself.

While failing to produce a consensus review of the treaty implementation, the 2010 RevCon was able to agree upon a 64-point Plan of Action10. The Plan built heavily on the 13 practical steps discussed in the context of the 2000 RevCon, and also addressed two more crucial elements:

  1. A commitment to hold a conference of Middle Eastern states in 2012 to discuss the creation of a WMD-free zone
  2. A reference to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons

Indeed, state parties showed deep concern about potential humanitarian consequences of any use of NWs. Building on this, between 2013 and 2014, three conferences were organised to discuss the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, through a process that became known as the Humanitarian Initiative (Norway, March 2013; Mexico, February 2014; Austria, December 2014). The conclusion the state parties reached was that the consequence of the use of NWs would be catastrophic, would transcend national borders, and would be beyond the international community’s ability to respond and provide relief.

In 2015, a total of 123 countries endorsed the Humanitarian Pledge, namely a commitment to fill the ‘legal gap’ for the prohibition and elimination of NWs. Such commitment concerned five main steps11:

  • Present the facts-based discussions, findings and evidence of the meetings held in Norway, Mexico and Austria
  • Follow the imperative of human security for all and promote the protection of civilians against the risks stemming from NWs
  • Encourage NPT members to renew their commitment to the urgent and full implementation of existing obligations under Article VI
  • Appeal to NWS to take concrete interim measures to reduce the risk of nuclear weapon detonations
  • Cooperate with all relevant stakeholders, states, international organisations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements, parliamentarians and civil society12

Setsuko Thurlow and former Chancellor Sebastian Kurz

Source: Dragan Antia-Tatic, https://www.icanw.org/history_of_the_tpnw

Much like the 2000 RevCon, the 2015 RevCon failed to reach agreement on the substantive part of the draft Final Document. This was mainly due to diverging views on the Middle East WMD-free zone. The differences in views between the Middle Eastern states themselves increased in the five years leading up to the Conference, and eventually they agreed to fix the date for a Middle East Conference for the following year.13

Due to Covid-19 restrictions, the 2020 RevCon was finally held in 2022. The members of the NPT failed to achieve consensus over the review of the treaty implementation. Most of the disagreements are attributable to Russia’s opposition to the RevCon proceedings in light of its recent invasion of Ukraine.

The next RevCon is scheduled for 2026 with sessions of the Preparatory Committee held in 2023 and 2024.

Footnotes

  1. https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/ ↩

  2. https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199532.pdf ↩

  3. https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199501.pdf ↩

  4. https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199503.pdf ↩

  5. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-05/features/npt-1995-terms-indefinite-extension ↩

  6. https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/1995-05-11_1995%20NPT%20Review%20and%20Extension%20conference%20adopts%20the%20Resolution%20on%20the%20Middle%20East.pdf ↩

  7. https://www.unidir.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/2000%20NPT%20RevCon%20Final%20Document_1.pdf ↩

  8. https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/new-agenda-coalition/ ↩

  9. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-06/2000-npt-review-conference-final-document ↩

  10. https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2010_fd_part_i.pdf ↩

  11. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14vienna_Pledge_Document.pdf ↩

  12. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14vienna_Pledge_Document.pdf ↩

  13. https://www.sipri.org/node/384 ↩

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